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LIMITATION OF DEFEASANCE CLAUSE -

Testatrix died leaving as her only heirs at law and next of kin a son, Thomas,
and a grandaughter, Malinda, to whom she devised her estate in approximately
equal shares. At the time she executed her will Thomas was twenty-two years
of age and unmarried and Malinda was eleven. The principal case turns on the
construction of a clause in her will, devising a parcel of land to Malinda, which
reads as follows: "I give and bequeath ... the same to the said Malinda McK.
Young and her children but if the said Malinda McK. Young shall die before
she attains the full age of twenty-one years without having been married, but if
she marries and dies without leaving child or children then in such a case I
give the same to my said son, Thomas H. Young." 1 Malinda married at the
age of twenty-four and had issue, but both her husband and the child predeceased her. Devisees of the testatrix' son, Thomas, claimed an executory
interest in the property on Malinda's death without surviving issue. Held, the
fee vested in Malinda subject to defeasance on one event only, namely, if
Malinda died without having married and borne a child before her twenty-first
birthday. Youngv. Munsey Trust Co., (App. D. C. 1940) III F. (2d) 514.
The general rule that each will is to be determined according to the intention of the testator often clashes with the antipathy of the courts toward the
defeasance of estates. 2 In the principal case the gift over is practically nullified
by the intent attributed to the testatrix. This case involves an ambiguity arising
from imperfect use of language in a will. The second "but if" in the clause
granting the fee is the cause of the difficulty. Was this used to introduce a new
and separate event on which defeasance should take place? If "but if" is interpreted to mean "or if," such would seem to be the case. A similar result is
reached if the devise is construed as an attempt to keep the property in the direct
descendants of the testatrix, or as an attempt to prefer her son over a possible
future husband of Malinda. On the other hand it may have been used, as the
court decides, merely to make an exception to the phrase "without having been
married." Under the latter view the fee will leave Malinda and her heirs only
if she dies before she reaches twenty-one, unmarried, and without having borne
a child. The intent of the testator is normally determined by the language employed in his will, read in its entirety and in the light of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation. 3 The court in the principal case followed this rule
1. The words "to Malinda and her children" involved a discussion of the rule in
Wild's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 16b, 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (1599). The court decided that
whether they followed that rule or not Malinda had at the date of her death a fee
simple title to the property devised. Application of the rule to the principal case
would give Malinda a fee simple estate. If the rule were rejected the son of Malinda
would have taken a vested estate in the remainder at his birth and on his death before
Malinda that estate would pass to Malinda by inheritance.
3 In re Singer's Estate, II6 Pa. Super. 32, 176 A. 519 (1935); In re Squier's
Estate, 199 Wis. 51, 225 N. W. 184 (1929); Carmichael v. Cole, 83 Colo. 575, 267
P. 408 (1928); Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Squire, 92 Conn. 440, 103 A.
269 (1918).
8 Frederick v. Alling, 118 Conn. 602, 174 A. 85 (1934); In re Donovan's Estate,
153 Misc. 593, 275 N. Y. S. 142 (1934), affirmed 243 App. Div. 597, 277 N. Y. S.
615 (1935); Tetlow v. Taylor, 54 R. I. 363, 173 A. 88 (1934); Domestic & Foreign
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explicitly. Though all rules of construction have been devised merely as aids to
the ascertainment of testamentary intent and are not to be applied where the
intent can be ascertained from the instrument itself,4 it is interesting to note
that the result here would have been the same had the court not found clear indications of intent in the will and had applied a rule of construction. There are
several such rules which the court could have used in construing this will.
(a) Preference for equality of distribution. Where there are two or more
constructions possible the courts will frequently take the one which accomplishes
the more equal distribution, on the theory that a testator normally seeks to distribute his property equally between those who have equal claims on his bounty
and intends to preserve equality between the lines of descent. 5 Thomas and
Malinda were given nearly equal estates subject only to the questionable disposition of the clause in question. Consequently the rule would seem to apply
here with whatever force it has. (b) Preference for early indefeasibility. For
various reasons 6 indefeasibility at the earliest possible moment consistent with
the manifest intent of the testator is a desirable objective in construing gifts of
this kind. To this end a number of rules have been devised by the courts.7
Among them appears the rule that a fee will be found indefeasible unless the
testator has made a clear and unambiguous expression of intent to the contrary.8
This presumption against defeasibility would be enough on which to base the
present decision should the court so desire. ( c) Construction of "dies without
leaving child or children." "When property is limited by an otherwise effective
conveyance 'to B and his heirs, but if B dies without issue, then to C,' or by
other language of similar import, and (a) the conveyance further provides
that for a described period the interest of B shall be subject ..• to a defeasance,
and (b) the ending of such described period is likely to occur between the date
upon which the conveyance speaks and the date of B's death, then, unless a
contrary intent of the conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances, the interest of C can become a present interest if, and only if, B dies
Missionary Society v. Crippled Children's Hospital, 163 Va. 114, 176 S. E. 193
(1934).
4
Will of Waterbury, 163 Wis. 510, 158 N. W. 340 (1916); Quarton v. Barton,
249 Mich. 474, 229 N. W. 465 (1930); In re Jarvis' Will, 152 Misc. 252, 273
N. Y. S. 294 (1934).
5
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) 66 F. (2d) 116;
In re Corlies' Will, 150 Misc. 596, 269 N. Y. S. 890 (1934), affirmed 242 App. Div.
703, 273 N. Y. S. 412 (1934); Bierly's Executor & Trustee v. Nelson, 228 Ky. 116,
14 S. W. (2d) 201 (1929).
6
"So long as an interest remains defeasible (1) the uncertainty thereby injected
makes such interest not readily marketable; (2) a transfer of complete property requires
the joinder not only of the owner of such interest but also of the interest which may
defeat it; (3) the present unrestricted enjoyment of the full value of the thing is postponed." 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 243, comment j (1940).
1
2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 41 (1936). That the courts look with disfavor
upon defeasance, see In re Field's Estate, 266 Pa. 474, 109 A. 677 (1920); Kibbe v.
City of Rochester, (D .. C. N. Y. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 542; Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v: Squire, 92 Conn. 440, 103 A. 269 (1918).
8
Williams v. Williams, 167 Tenn. 26, 65 S. W. (2d) 561 (1934).
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at or before the end of such described period and is unsurvived by issue at the
time of his death." 9 The clause in testatrix' will "but if the said Malinda . • •
shall die before she attains the full age of twenty-one years without having been
married" makes available an intermediate date to which Malinda's death can
be referred under the above rule. This rule is established on the basis of the early
indefeasibility it attains and-what is more important-on the theory that it
embodies the intent most reasonably to be inferred from the use of such a limitation.10 Thus it is apparent that the court in the principal case could have resorted to the use of rules of construction to reach a similar result. That it did
not feel so inclined is evidence of the general tendency of the courts to decide
problems of construction on a basis of pure intent whenever possible. Whether
such a tendency is desirable may be open to question in cases where no clear
indication of intent appears.11

Herbert R. Whiting

9

3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 268 (1940).
3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 268, comment

a ( I 940).
11 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SouRcEs OF THE LAW 317 (1909).
lO

